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LOGGERS OR WOODPECKERS: WHO'S ENDANGERED NOW?:
REGION 8 FOREST SERVICE TIMBER PURCHASERS
COUNCIL V. ALCOCK
I. INTRODUCrION
Recent measures adopted by the United States Forest Service
to protect endangered species in national forests' have angered
timber companies nationwide. 2 Because of restrictions placed on
logging in areas where endangered species live, timber sales have
declined and lumber prices have risen.3 This situation has caused a
1. For a discussion of the recent measures taken by the Forest Service to pro-
tect the endangered red-cockaded woodpecker in the Southern region, see infra
notes 17-23 and accompanying text. See also WOODPECKER CHAPTER oF WLDLIFE
HABITAT MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK, Admin. Record 95 (Forest Service 1985).
For examples of recent measures taken in other parts of the country to pro-
tect endangered species in those regions, see Tom Kenworthy, Timber Plan Brings
Little Peace to Oregonians, WAsH. POsr, July 4, 1993, at A8 [hereinafter Kenworthy,
Timber Plan] (discussing government's plan to limit timber cutting in Northwest to
protect endangered spotted owl); John Lancaster, House Votes to Limit Logging in
Vast Alaskan Tract, WASH. PosT, July 14, 1989, at A6 (discussing measures taken in
Alaska's national forest to limit logging in preservation effort).
2. See, e.g., Timber Firms Fighting Woodpecker Protection, MiAMH HERALD, Sept. 11,
1990, at B4 (discussing clash between supporters of Southeast's endangered red-
cockaded woodpecker and local loggers). See also Scott Armstrong, Congress to De-
cide Timber Dispute, CHrusrAN Sci. MONrrOR, Sept. 15, 1989, at 8 (discussing analo-
gous clash between environmentalists and loggers in Northwest over protectionist
measures for endangered spotted owl). The Northwest timber industry "contends
that conservationists are putting trees and owls before people and that a continued
ban on logging would undermine the economies of hundreds of mill towns
throughout the [Northwest]." Id.
3. SeeJohn Gallagher, Hew and Cry Home Buyers Suffer as Lumber Pices Skyrocke
DErrorr FREE PREss, May 16, 1993, at K1 (blaming environmentalists and curtailed
logging in Northwest for rise in price of lumber that has consequently affected
national real estate market); H. Jane Lehman, Bird Battles May Raise Home Costs,
WASH. Pos, May 20, 1989, at F1 (discussing increase in home prices in West due
to suspended logging activities over endangered spotted owl). But see John M.
Berry, The Owl's Golden Egg Environmentalism Could Boost Lumber Profits and Prices,
WASH. PosT, Aug. 4, 1991, at HI (suggesting depressed timber industry will profit
from increased demand, rising prices, and forced decrease in production capacity
caused by logging restrictions).
(529)
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loss of jobs,4 industry,5 and social well-being 6 in the surrounding
timber communities. Meanwhile, the Forest Service is constantly
trying to balance protecting endangered species, a national prior-
ity,7 with maintaining the economic well-being of Americans who
depend on logging in national forests for their livelihood.
In Region 8 Forest Service Timber Purchasers Council v. Alcock,8 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit considered
whether timber companies had standing to sue the United States
Forest Service.9 The timber companies alleged that the Forest Ser-
vice changed its policy for protecting the red-cockaded wood-
pecker, an endangered species,' 0 without properly following the
procedures established under the Endangered Species Act (the
"Species Act")," the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA")12
4. See Tom Kenworthy, Interior Secretary at Center of Storm Over Handling of Owl
Controversy, WASH. PosT, Mar. 22, 1992, at A8 [hereinafter Kenworthy, Interior Secre-
tay] (officials predicting loss of 31,000 jobs in logging communities surrounding
endangered spotted owl because of limit on timber harvesting). For a discussion
of quality of life injuries, including loss ofjobs and tax base erosion, see infra notes
85-89 and accompanying text.
5. See Mark A. Stein, Lawsuits Cut Into Timber Industry Future, MIAMI HERALD,
Aug. 6, 1989, at A22 (discussing plight of timber industry in Oregon and expected
plant closings). It is logical to expect that the policy recently enacted for the red-
cockaded woodpecker will have detrimental effects on the surrounding communi-
ties similar to those felt by communities surrounding the spotted owl habitat. For
further discussion of the recent policy adopted by the Forest Service to protect the
red-cockaded woodpecker, see infra notes 17-23.
6. See Lou Cannon, Saw-Toothed Despair Leaves Mark on Northwestern Loggers,
WAsH. PosT, July 27, 1991, at A3 (stating that decline of timber industry in Wash-
ington state, sparked by protection of northern spotted owl, has resulted in in-
creased domestic violence, alcoholism, mental health breakdowns, juvenile crime,
and attempted juvenile suicide); Kenworthy, Timber Plan, supra note 1, at A8 (dis-
cussing impact on logging towns, including increased rate of family breakups and
suicides in anticipation of rising unemployment).
7. See Endangered Species Act of 1973 §§ 2-18, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (1988)
[hereinafter SpeciesAct]. The Species Act "declare [s] ... the policy of Congress [to
be] that all Federal departments and agencies shall seek to conserve endangered
species." Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531(c) (1). Furthermore, "[e]ach Federal
agency shall... insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such
agency.. . is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered
species." Id. § 1536 (a) (2). See also Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 153
(1978) (noting that Congress intended protection of endangered species to be
afforded highest priority).
8. 993 F.2d 800 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub nom. Southern Timber Pur-
chasers Council v. Meier, 114 S. Ct. 683 (1994).
9. Region 8 Forest Serv., 993 F.2d at 802.
10. For a discussion of the red-cockaded woodpecker's listing on the endan-
gered species list, see infra note 18.
11. Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44. For a discussion of the Species Act, see
infra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
12. The National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") §§ 2-209, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 4321-61 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). For a discussion of NEPA, see infra notes 29-31
and accompanying text.
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and the National Forest Management Act ("NFMA7).1 3 The court
held that the timber companies did not have standing to challenge
the policy change of the Forest Service. 14 As the standing issue may
arise in the future, particularly in light of the on-going spotted owl
controversy in the Pacific Northwest, 15 this case has important prec-
edential value and may prevent other disgruntled loggers from
challenging similar Forest Service actions in the future.
This Note analyzes the decision in Region 8 Forest Service, and
the consequences of the holding on the timber industry. Section II
of this Note provides the factual background of the legal dispute.
Section III summarizes and examines the relevant environmental
legislation applied in the instant case. Next, Section IV discusses
the Region 8 Forest Service holding, and then highlights possible flaws
in the court's reasoning. Finally, Section V considers the decision's
impact, focusing on the potential effect on the national timber
industry.
II. FACTS
In Region 8 Forest Service, several timber companies16 challenged
the Forest Service's revision of a policy governing the tree-cutting
under timber contracts within a certain radius17 of the endan-
13. The National Forest Management Act ("NFMA"), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-14
(1988). For a discussion of NFMA, see infra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
14. Region 8 Forest Serv., 993 F.2d at 811.
15. See Mark Bonnett & Kurt Zimmerman, Politics and Preservation: The Endan-
gered Species Act and the Northern Spotted Ow 18 EcoLoGY L.Q. 105 (1991) (discuss-
ing spotted owl controversy and protection measures undertaken); Alyson C.
Flournoy, Beyond the "Spotted Owl Problem: Learning From the Old-Growth Controversy,
17 HARv. ENVrL. L. REv. 261 (1993) (discussing dimensions of spotted owl contro-
versy). See alsoJ.A. Savage, Who Cares About Owls?Jobs Are More Importan4 L.A. DAMLY
J., May 9, 1990, at 6 (criticizing political system and environmentalists for placing
protection of spotted owl before jobs).
16. The plaintiff, Southern Timber Purchasers Council (formerly Region 8
Forest Service Timber Purchasers Council), is a coalition of purchasers of national
forest timber in the South. Region 8 Forest Serv., 993 F.2d at 802. Members of the
Council include Hankins Lumber Company, Inc., Hood Industries, Inc., and Hunt
Plywood Company, Inc. (the "timber companies"). Id. The timber companies
held contracts with the Forest Service to harvest timber in national forests in the
Southern Region. Id. Those contracts included an endangered species clause
which allowed the Forest Service to cancel or unilaterally alter the contracts "if the
protection measures prove[d] inadequate." Id. at 803-04 (citing contract).
17. Id. at 803. The first phase of the three-phase strategy developed by the
Forest Service involved strictly limiting the permissible methods for timber cutting
within three-fourths of a mile of a woodpecker colony. Id. This policy was "applica-
ble to all awarded and pending timber contracts, advertised timber sales and pro-
posed timber sales." Id.
19941
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gered 18 red-cockaded woodpecker's habitat. 19 In 1985, in compli-
ance with NFMA and the Species Act,20 the Forest Service adopted
a recovery plan for the woodpecker in an attempt to prevent fur-
ther loss of the species.2' Despite the efforts made under the plan,
however, the woodpecker population continued to decline.22 Thus,
in 1989, the Forest Service initiated a new strategy for protecting
the species by restricting timber harvesting to a more limited area
of the national forests.2 3 The timber companies, each of which had
contracted with the United States government to harvest timber,24
challenged the Forest Service's adoption of this new policy, claim-
ing that the move violated the Species Act, NEPA, and NFMA. 25
18. See 50 C.F.R § 17.11(h) (1992) (containing the official listing of the red-
cockaded woodpecker as endangered by the Department of Interior). The red-
cockaded woodpecker was listed as "endangered" in 1970 after extensive clearing
of Southeastern pine forests brought the woodpecker to near extinction. Region 8
Forest Serv., 993 F.2d at 803. The majority of remaining woodpecker clans live in
various national forests in the South. Id.
19. Region 8 Forest Serv., 993 F.2d at 803.
20. For a discussion of the consultation and management plan procedures
required of the Forest Service for any actions that may affect an endangered spe-
cies, see infra notes 31-42 and accompanying text.
21. Region 8 Forest Serv., 993 F.2d at 803. The 1985 plan adopted by the Forest
Service is outlined in the Woodpecker Chapter of the Forest Service's Wildlife
Habitat Management Handbook and is based upon consultation with the Fish and
Wildlife Service. Id. The original 1979 recovery plan permitted clear-cutting of
timber in areas outside a 200-foot buffer zone around the woodpecker colonies.
See David H. Getches & Karin Sheldon, Recent Developnents in Public Land Law, C722
A.L.I.-A.BA. 403, 412 (1992).
22. Region 8 Forest Serv., 993 F.2d at 803. As a result, the Forest Service began
receiving litigation threats by environmental groups such as the Sierra Club Legal
Defense Fund. Id. The Sierra Club threatened to take legal action "if the Forest
Service continued its alleged 'inadequate management practices' for protecting
the [w] oodpecker." Id. Ironically, these threats came after the Forest Service had
informally consulted with the Fish and Wildlife Service regarding plan revisions.
Id. The consultation closely followed an injunction ordering the Forest Service to
take certain measures to protect the woodpecker in national forests in Texas. Id.
at 803 n.1.
23. Id., at 803. For a discussion of the new strategy, see supra note 17.
24. Id. The timber companies' contracts provided that "all disputes arising
under or relating to" the contracts were "to be resolved in accordance with the
Contract Disputes Act [CDA]." Id. For a discussion of CDA and its relevance to the
jurisdiction of the Region 8 Forest Service court, see infra notes 43-45 and accompany-
ing text.
25. Id. at 802. The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia dismissed the timber companies' claim under NEPA for lack of standing.
Id. The court also entered summary judgment for the government on the timber
companies' claims under the Species Act and NFMA for lack of standing. Id. The
Eleventh Circuit in Region 8 Forest Service affirmed the district court's dismissal of
the NEPA claim and entry of summary judgment on the Species Act claim. Id.
However, the court vacated the district court's entry of summary judgment on
NFMA with instructions to dismiss the claim for lack ofjurisdiction. Id.
4
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In order to establish standing to sue the Forest Service, the
plaintiffs needed to demonstrate that injury-in-fact had occurred.26
The timber companies alleged that they had suffered economic,
quality of life, environmental, and procedural injuries. 27 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found that
the timber companies had not suffered injury-in-fact and held that
they lacked standing to sue the Forest Service for alleged violations
of the Species Act, NEPA, or NFMA.28
III. BACKGROUND
A. Pertinent Environmental Legislation
In effect since 1969, NEPA29 ostensibly encourages harmony
between man and the environment NEPA's main goal is to bal-
ance the productive and recreational uses of the environment 3 0
Under NEPA, the Forest Service must prepare an environmental
impact statement for each forest plan it promulgates or intends to
amend.31
Congress passed the Species Act32 in 1973, intending to re-
quire that all federal agencies help conserve species listed as "en-
dangered" or "threatened."33 The Species Act requires the Forest
Service to consult with the Fish and Wildlife Service34 to ensure that
26. Region 8 Forest Sewv., 993 F.2d at 805. For a full discussion of the require-
ments necessary to establish standing, see infra notes 46-55 and accompanying text.
27. Id. Initially, the timber companies claimed to suffer only economic, envi-
ronmental, and procedural injuries as a result of the Forest Service's failure to fully
implement the Woodpecker Chapter of the Handbook and its adoption of the new
policy in violation of the Species Act, NEPA, and NFMA. Id. After the district
court dismissed their NEPA claim for lack of standing, the timber companies filed
a motion for reconsideration. Id. Along with this motion, the companies included
several affidavits which contained new allegations of "quality of life" injuries. Id.
Thus, the timber companies ultimately alleged four types of injury-in-fact. For a
complete discussion of each injury alleged by the timber companies, see infra notes
72-105 and accompanying text.
28. Region 8 Forest Serv., 993 F.2d at 811. For a discussion of the court's analy-
sis and reasoning in rejecting each of the four claims of injury, see infra notes 72-
105 and accompanying text.
29. NEPA §§ 2-209, 42 U.S.C. § 4321-61.
30. NEPA § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 4321.
31. See 36 C.F.R. §§ 219.10(b), (f), 219.12 (1992).
32. Species Act, §§ 2-18, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44.
33. Id. § 2(c) (1), 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (c) (1). To determine if a species is "endan-
gered," the Secretary of Interior or the Secretary of Commerce must follow an
application procedure for exemption. Id. § 3, 16 U.S.C. § 1532; see also 50 C.F.R.
§ 452 (1992) (listing procedural rules for making exemption determination).
34. Id. §§ 402.13-.14 (1992). The consultation is a two-step process. First,
there is an informal consultation. Id. § 402.13. If it is determined that the action is
not likely to affect an endangered species, the consultation process ceases. Id.
19941
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any action it takes "is not likely to jeopardize the continued exist-
ence of any endangered species.., or result in the destruction...
of [the] habitat of such species."35
One year later Congress passed NFMA36 in an attempt to bal-
ance environmental and industry-related interests.37 NFMA re-
quires the Forest Service to promulgate land and resource
management plans for each of the national forests.38 In connec-
tion with these plans, the forest service must establish the antici-
pated level of timber sales.8 9 The land and resource management
plans must be developed to "provide for multiple use.., and...
include coordination of outdoor recreation, range, timber, water-
shed, wildlife and fish, and wilderness."40 NFMA further specifies
that land management plans must ensure that timber harvesting
and clear-cutting are performed in a manner consistent with the
protection of wildlife.41 If any proposed action is inconsistent with
the management plan in effect, the Forest Service must formally
adopt a plan amendment in order to authorize the proposed
action.42
Frequently, suits brought under the Species Act, NEPA, or
NFMA involve private parties that entered into contracts with the
However, if officials conclude that the action is likely to adversely affect an endan-
gered species, formal consultation ensues. Id. § 402.14.
35. Species Act § 7(a) (2), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (2).
36. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1687.
37. NFMA § 2(3), 16 U.S.C. § 1600(3). "[T]o serve the national interest, the
renewable resource program must be based on a comprehensive assessment of
present and anticipated uses, demand for, and supply of renewable resources from
the Nation's public . .. forests . .. through analysis of environmental and eco-
nomic impacts." Id.
One of the fundamental purposes of the National Forest System is to "furnish
a continuous supply of timber for the use and necessities of citizens of the United
States." 16 U.S.C. § 475 (describing extent of Forest Service's statutory authority).
NFMA requires the Forest Service to provide timber through a timber sale process.
NMFA § 13, 16 U.S.C. § 1611. Generally, private companies bid for the right to
harvest a specific volume and type of timber in a particular forest, and the highest
bidder is awarded a timber contract. 16 U.S.C. § 472a; see also 36 C.F.R. § 223.3
(1992) (authorizing sale of seized forest products to highest bidder).
38. NFMA § 6, 16 U.S.C. § 1604. The Forest Service must coordinate its plans
with "the land and resource management planning processes of State and local
governments and other Federal agencies." Id. § 6(a), 16 U.S.C. § 1604(a).
39. Id. § 6(f) (2), 16 U.S.C. § 1604(f) (2). The forest plans must also include
guidelines for identifying the suitability of lands for timber harvest. Id.
40. Id. § 6(e) (1), 16 U.S.C. § 1604(e) (1). NFMA also provides that land man-
agement plans be developed to "provide for diversity of plant and animal commu-
nities based on the suitability and capability of the specific land area in order to
meet overall multiple-use objectives." Id. § 6(g) (3) (B), 16 U.S.C. § 1604 (g) (3) (B).
41. Id. § 6(g) (3) (E)-(F), 16 U.S.C. § 16 0 4 (g) (3) (E)-(F).
42. NFMA § 6(f) (4), 16 U.S.C. § 1604(f) (4).
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Forest Service or some other governmental agency. In this situa-
tion the Contract Disputes Act ("CDA") controls.43 Congress
passed the CDA in 1978 to divest all district and circuit courts of
jurisdiction over any contracts entered into with the government.44
Essentially, the CDA forces parties with grievances arising out of a
contract with the government to bring the action in the United
States Federal Claims Court for relief.45
B. The Doctrine of Standing
Article III of the United States Constitution enables federal
courts to adjudicate only actual "cases" or "controversies."46 This
limitation requires that every litigant have standing to sue.47 In or-
der for there to be standing, a litigant must be "entitled to have the
court decide the merits of the dispute."48 The United States
Supreme Court has interpreted this to mean that a party must have
a sufficient personal stake in a controversy to justify ajudicial reso-
lution of the case. 49
In Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans for Separation of
Church and State, Inc.,50 the United States Supreme Court set forth
three requirements that a plaintiff must satisfy to establish stand-
ing.51 First, the plaintiff must have suffered injury-in-fact.52 Sec-
43. The Contract Disputes Act of 1978 ("CDA") §§ 2-15, 41 U.S.C. §§ 601-13
(1988 & Supp. V 1993).
44. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States, 754 F.2d 365, 370-71 (Federal
Cir. 1985). CDA provides that "[u]nless otherwise specifically provided herein,
[CDA] applies to any express or implied contract... entered into by an executive
agency for... the disposal of personal property." CDA § 4(a), 41 U.S.C § 602(a).
45. See id §§ 2-15, 41 U.S.C. §§ 601-11. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (2) (1988)
(allocatingjurisdiction over action brought against government founded upon Act
of Congress or regulation of executive department to United States Federal Claims
Court).
46. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750
(1984) (limiting federal court jurisdiction to settling "cases and controversies").
47. For a general discussion and understanding of the doctrine of standing,
see William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing 98 YALE LJ. 221 (1988). For a
discussion of the standing doctrine in an environmental context, see Roger Beers,
Standing and Related Procedural Hurdles in Environmental Litigation, 1 J. ENvrL. L. &
LrnG. 65 (1986); Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? Toward Legal
Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. Rxv. 450 (1972).
48. Allen, 468 U.S. at 750-51 (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498
(1975)).
49. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732 (1972).
50. 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
51. Id. at 472.
52. Id. The injury-in-fact "must be an invasion of a legally protected interest
which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) 'actual or imminent', not 'conjec-
tural' or 'hypothetical'." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136
(1992) (citations omitted).
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ond, there must be a causal connection between the challenged
conduct and the injury.53 Finally, it must be likely that a favorable
decision by the court will redress the injury complained of by the
party.54 All three elements must be present to establish standing.55
53. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans for Separation of Church and
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982); see also Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. at 2136.
In other words, the injury must be "fairly traceable" to the conduct of the defend-
ant and cannot be the result of an independent act of a third party. Id.
54. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472. Redressability must be "likely," not merely
"speculative." Defenders of Wildlf 112 S. Ct. at 2136. Beyond the three basic con-
stitutional requirements, the Supreme Court identified three prudential principles
to consider when addressing the issue of standing. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 474.
First, a" 'plaintiff generally must assert his own legal rights and interests, and can-
not rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.'" Id.
(quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975)). Second, federal courts will
not adjudicate " 'abstract questions of wide public significance' " even if the plain-
tiff has alleged injury sufficient to meet the constitutional requirements. Id. at 475
(quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 499-500). Third, the plaintiff's complaint must fall
within the" 'zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or consti-
tutional guarantee in question.'" Id. (quoting Association of Data Processing Serv.
Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970)).
Furthermore, there are three requirements that must be satisfied to establish
"associational standing" after the core constitutional requirements and prudential
components have been met: (1) the members of the association must have stand-
ing to sue in their own right; (2) the interests the organization seeks to protect
must be pertinent to its purpose; and (3) the participation of the association's
individual members must not be required in the lawsuit. Region 8 Forest Serv., 993
F.2d at 805 n.3. (citing Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432
U.S. 333, 343 (1977)). However, because the three core requirements of injury-in-
fact, causation, and redressability were not satisfied in Region 8 Forest Service, the
Eleventh Circuit only briefly mentioned these additional elements of associational
standing. Region Forest Sew., 993 F.2d at 805 n.3.
55. Id. at 805. Thie threshold issue of standing is subject to de novo review.
United States v. 5000 Palmetto Drive, 928 F.2d 373, 375 (11th Cir. 1991) (citing
United States v. $38,000 in U.S. Currency, 816 F.2d 1538, 1544 (11th Cir. 1987));
United States v. Massell, 823 F.2d 1503, 1506 (11th Cir. 1987) (noting that on
appeal, court must examine evidence in light most favorable to complaining party)
(citing United States v. Torres, 720 F.2d 1506, 1510 (lth Cir. 1983)).
The nature of review also depends upon the stage in the proceedings at which
standing is challenged. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. at 2136-37. When the de-
fendant challenges the action via a motion to dismiss for lack of standing, "both
the trial and reviewing courts must accept as true all material allegations of the
complaint." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,501 (1975). Courts are not restricted to
the face of the complaint but may rely on affidavits submitted by the plaintiff to
find standing. Id. When the action is challenged by a motion for summary judg-
ment, however, the plaintiffs can no longer rest on their allegations "but must 'set
forth' by affidavit... other 'specific facts' which will be taken to be true" for the
purpose of summaryjudgment. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. at 2137 (citing FED.
R. Cw. P. 56(e)).
[Vol. V. p. 529
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C. Standing in Prior Environmental Decisions
The issue of standing has arisen in several prior environmental
decisions. 56 Most of these cases involved environmental groups
claiming that they had standing to challenge federal agency actions
which had harmed the environment. 57 Prior to 1972, it was uncer-
tain whether environmental organizations had standing to sue
when they were merely representing the public interest in protec-
tion of the environment.58 In 1972, the Supreme Court clarified
some of this uncertainty in Sierra Club v. Morton.59
In Morton, a conservation group sought standing to challenge a
plan to construct a ski resort in a national forest;60 defendants ar-
gued that the plaintiff lacked.standing. The Court held that organi-
zations representing the public's environmental concerns would
have standing to sue if the organization adequately alleged that its
members used the affected national forest for recreational or other
purposes.61
In 1973, the Supreme Court further defined the injury-in-fact
requirement in United States v. Students Challenging Regulatoiy Agency
Procedures (SCRAP).62 The Court ruled that standing would not be
denied simply because many other individuals could claim a similar
injury.63 Both Morton and SCRAP demonstrate that careful plead-
56. For a discussion of these decisions, see infra notes 59-70 and accompany-
ing text.
57. See infra notes 59-70 and accompanying text.
58. 61A Am. JuR. 29 Pollution Control § 500 (1981).
59. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
60. Id. at 730-31.
61. Id. at 734-35. The conservation group in Morton was denied standing be-
cause it failed to "allege that it or its members would be affected in any of their
activities or pastimes" by the proposed construction of the resort. Id. at 735. An
allegation by Sierra Club in its pleadings that any of its members hiked or made
use of the national forest would have been sufficient to establish injury-in-fact.
Morton also represents the first time the issue of standing was addressed where an
environmental organization alleged a non-economic injury. Id. at 734. The Court
noted that "[a] esthetic and environmental well-being, like economic well-being, are
important ingredients of the quality of life in our society, and the fact that particu-
lar environmental interests are shared by the many rather than the few does not
make them less deserving of legal protection through the judicial process," Id.
Thus, Morton expanded the scope of injury-in-fact to include non-economic inju-
ies. Id. at 738.
62. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
63. Id. at 687. In United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Proce-
dures (SCRAP), a group of law school students formed an environmental associa-
tion and challenged increases in freight rates set by the Interstate Commerce
Commission ("ICC"). Id. at 678-79. The association alleged that the ICC
surcharge would discourage the transportation and use of recyclable materials and
therefore would adversely affect the association's use of the environment for recre-
ational purposes. Id. at 685. The Court held that the group's allegations of af-
1994]
9
Barone: Loggers or Woodpeckers: Who's Endangered Now: Region 8 Forest Ser
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1994
538 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAw JOuRNAL [Vol. V: p. 5 29
ing of both injury and use of the afflicted resource could easily sat-
isfy the requirements of the standing doctrine as applied to
environmental plaintiffs.
More recent Supreme Court decisions have established limits
on standing for environmental groups. In a 1990 Supreme Court
decision, Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation,6 an environmental or-
ganization challenged a Bureau of Land Management land-with-
drawal program.6 5 In its decision, the Court required that the
environmental group make very specific allegations to achieve
standing.66
In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,67 a 1992 Supreme Court deci-
sion, environmental groups sought to challenge a regulation inter-
preting the Species Act to be inapplicable to actions undertaken in
foreign nations.6 8 The Court rejected each of the plaintiffs' theo-
ries of alleged injury.6 9 Specifically, the Court stressed that it would
not adopt a policy which would allow standing to all plaintiffs whose
interest in the threatened animals was genuine or professional.7 0
This recent trend suggests that more exact pleading may be neces-
sary for environmental plaintiffs to establish standing.
IV. REGoN 8-FoREsT SERWCE TMFsR PURcG-LSERS COUNCL
v ALcocK
A. The Eleventh Circuit's Analysis
In Region 8 Forest Service, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit determined that the timber companies had
fected use of local forests, streams, and mountains were sufficient to establish
standing. Id. at 689-90.
64. 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
65. Id. at 871.
66. Id. at 889. The court held that the environmental group failed to show
that its members were "adversely affected or aggrieved" by agency action. Id. at
889 (referring to language of Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702
(1988)).
67. 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1990).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 2139-40. The environmental group advanced several novel standing
theories, each of which was summarily rejected by the court. Id. The "ecosystem
nexus" theory alleged that any user of a contiguous ecosystem affected by the ac-
tion had standing to sue. Id. at 2139. The group's "animal nexus" approach ar-
gued that anyone with an interest in observing the endangered species anywhere
on the planet had standing. Id. Under the "professional nexus" theory, anyone
with a professional interest in the animals could sue. The Court dismissed these
theories noting that "Is] tanding is not 'an ingenious academic exercise in the con-
ceivable.'" Id. (quoting SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 688).
70. Id. at 2139-40.
10
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not suffered injury-in-fact 71 and, therefore, had no standing to sue.
This section discusses each of the alleged injuries in detail and then
analyzes the court's reasoning in finding the allegations insufficient
to establish standing.
1. Alleged Economic Injuries
The timber companies first alleged three economic injuries,
which they contended were the result of the Forest Service's imple-
mentation of the new woodpecker policy. They alleged: (1) a re-
duction in available timber under the existing contracts; 72 (2)
increased logging costs;73 and (3) a reduction in future timber sup-
plies.74 The Region 8 Forest Service court reasoned that the first two
economic injuries were not jurisdictionally cognizable by the court
because they arose75 out of contracts with the United States govern-
ment.76 Thus, the alleged injuries fell within CDA resolution proce-
dures.77 Permitting timber companies to use these contractual
injuries as a basis for standing in actions brought under the Species
Act, NEPA, or NFMA would circumvent an express congressional
mandate requiring that such contractual disputes be settled under
the CDA. 78
71. Establishing injury-in-fact is just one of three requirements to establish
standing. For a discussion of the three constitutional requirements for standing,
see supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
72. Region 8 Forest Serv., 993 F.2d at 807.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See Megapulse, Inc. v. Lewis, 672 F.2d 959, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (stating
that whether action arose out of contract is determined by looking at source of
rights asserted and type of relief sought). For a discussion of whether the eco-
nomic injuries alleged in Region 8 Forest Service actually arose from the timber com-
panies' contracts with the federal government, see infra notes 112-22 and
accompanying text.
76. Region 8 Forest Serw., 993 F.2d at 807. The timber companies had contracts
with the Forest Service, a federal agency, to cut timber in national forests in the
South. Id. at 802.
77. Id. at 807. The timber companies' contracts provided that "all disputes
arising under or relating to" the contracts were to be resolved in accordance with
CDA, meaning that any action had to be brought in the United States Federal
Claims Court. Id. Thus, since the district court was essentially stripped of its juris-
diction by this provision, the Eleventh Circuit consequently did not have appellate
jurisdiction over the matter. Id.
Notwithstanding, the court reasoned that CDA would apply even in the ab-
sence of such a provision in the contracts. Id. at 807 n.10 (citing 41 U.S.C.
§ 602(a) (4) (1988) ("[CDA] applies to any express or implied contract... entered
into by any agency.... .")); see also North Side Lumber Co. v. Block, 753 F.2d 1482,
1486 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding timber contract falls within CDA), cert. denied sub
nom. Bohemia, Inc. v. Block, 474 U.S. 919 (1985).
78. Id. See generally CDA §§ 2-15, 41 U.S.C. §§ 601-13; 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (al-
locating jurisdiction over any actions brought against government founded upon
1994] 539
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The court held that the third alleged economic injury, a reduc-
tion in the amount of timber available for future contracts, also
failed to establish standing7 ° The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that
the timber companies had no right to harvest a set amount of tim-
ber each year,8 0 nor did they have a right to compel the Forest Ser-
vice to sell any timber to them in the future.8 ' Furthermore, the
court noted that even if the timber companies did have a continu-
ing harvest right to future timber, this alleged injury still failed to
satisfy the third constitutional element of standing:8 2 there was no
"substantial likelihood" 3 that this injury would be redressed by the
any Act of Congress or regulation of executive department to United States Fed-
eral Claims Court). The Region 8 Forest Service court distinguished a Tenth Circuit
decision, National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 455 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1971), rev'd,
486 F.2d 995 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974). See Region 8 Forest
Seru., 993 F.2d at 808 n.11. The timber companies tried to use National Helium to
support their argument that the CDA did not prohibit consideration by the court
of their contract injuries in assessing whether they had standing. Id.
In National Helium, a corporation brought suit alleging injuries from a termi-
nation of a contract with the government in violation of NEPA. National Helium,
455 F.2d at 652. The Tenth Circuit held that the termination was subject to the
requirements of NEPA. Id. at 657. The Region 8 Forest Sercne court noted that the
standing issue was not discussed in National Helium. Region 8 Forest Ser., 993 F.2d
at 808 n.11. The Eleventh Circuit found National Helium distinguishable because it
was possible in that case that the plaintiff had suffered a non-contractual injury
sufficient to confer standing under NEPA. Id.
79. Id. at 808.
80. Id. See also NFMA §§ 6(e), 13(a), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1604(e), 1611(a). NFMA
requires the Forest Service to determine timber harvest levels. The Forest Service
is to set these levels to "limit the sale of timber from each national forest to a
quantity equal to or less than a quantity which can be removed from such forest
annually in perpetuity on a sustained-yield basis." Id. § 13(a), 16 U.S.C. § 1611(a).
The Forest Service can control how much timber should be harvested annually;
any quantity demanded or desired by any timber company for a particular year has
no legal significance. See id.
81. Region 8 Forest Ser., 993 F.2d at 808 (citing Intermountain Forest Indus.
Ass'n v. Lyng, 683 F. Supp. 1330, 1340 (D. Wyo. 1988) (holding timber companies
have no right to future timber). The court in Region 8 Forest Service, relying on
Choctaw Manufacturing Co. v. United States, 761 F.2d 609, 615 (11th Cir. 1985),
rejected the timber companies' argument that they were in a position similar to
that of a losing bidder on a government contract. Region 8 Forest Serv., 993 F.2d at
808 n.12. The court emphasized that losing bidders have a right to bid procedures
that conform with applicable statutes and regulations and their bids cannot be
arbitrarily rejected. Id. According to the court, however, the two scenarios are
distinguishable because timber companies have no analogous right. Id.
82. Region 8 Forest Ser., 993 F.2d at 808. For a discussion of the three constitu-
tional elements required for standing, see supra notes 46-55 and accompanying
text. The third constitutional element is a "substantial likelihood" that the injury
will be redressed by a favorable decision of the court. Id. (citing Duke Power Co. v.
Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 75 n.20 (1978)).
83. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 75
n.20 (1978) (observing that precedent requires showing only "substantial likeli-
hood" that requested relief will redress injury).
[Vol. V- p. 529
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relief sought from the court, since greater timber availability in the
future was "purely speculative." 84
2. Alleged Quality of Life Injuries
The timber companies also alleged that they had suffered inju-
ries to their quality of life.85 The three alleged quality of life inju-
ries included: "(1) layoffs and income reductions;86  (2) a
decreasing tax base;87 and (3) a loss in public services."8 8 The Re-
gion 8 Forest Service court held that these injuries were "simply atten-
uated versions of the economic injuries... already considered" and
summarily dismissed the timber companies' arguments.8 9
3. Alleged Environmental Injuries
Next, the timber companies alleged environmental injuries.90
They claimed to be "interested in developing [woodpecker preser-
vation] strategies which [were] consistent with forest plans, scientifi-
cally defensible, and [did] not impose unwarranted restrictions on
timber harvesting."91 The court rejected this contention as insuffi-
84. Region 8 Forest Sew., 993 F.2d at 808. In national forests, the availability of
timber for private parties depends on the land's condition, and the private parties'
assurances that the tree-cutting methods will not prevent future replanting of
trees. NFMA § 6(g)(3)(E)-(F), 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(E)-(F). Future timber
availability is based upon site-specific analysis and thus "may or may not be affected
by either full implementation of the Woodpecker Chapter or by setting aside the
Policy." Region 8 Forest Serv., 993 F.2d at 808; see also Asarco Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S.
605, 614 (1989) (denying standing where redressability of injury is pure
speculation).
85. Region 8 Forest Ser., 993 F.2d at 809.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. In their appellate brief, the timber companies alleged that a loss in
public services would occur because, by law, 25% of Forest Service timber profits
are returned to local counties "for [the] benefit of the public schools and public
roads." Id. at 809 n.13 (citing 16 U.S.C § 500). However, since this injury was
alleged for the first time in the timber companies' appellate brief, the court could
not consider it, as the court's scope of review was restricted to the complaint and
the affidavits. Id. (citing Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 547
(1986) (facts supporting standing cannot be gleaned from briefs and arguments
alone)).
89. Region 8 Forest Serv., 993 F.2d at 809. The court dismissed the quality of
life injuries on the same two grounds that rendered the allegation of economic
injury insufficient. Id. First, to the extent that the injuries arose out of the con-
tracts, the issue had to be settled under the CDA and therefore in Federal Claims
Court. Id. Second, to the extent that the injuries arose out of a loss of future
timber sales, the timber companies had no such right to the timber. Id. For a full
discussion of the court's dismissal of the economic injuries and reasoning, see
supra notes 72-84.
90. Id.
91. Id.
1994]
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cient to support standing since it alleged nothing more than a mere
interest in the problem 92 and the companies did not allege that a
personal injury had been suffered. 93
The timber companies further claimed that their environmen-
tal interest in woodpecker preservation was partly motivated by
their employees' interest in the outdoors. 94 The doctrine of stand-
ing requires that plaintiffs assert their own rights and not rely on
the rights of others. 95 As the Region 8 Forest Service court noted, ex-
ceptions to this limitation arise under limited circumstances, 96
none of which were present in the instant case. 97 Therefore, the
92. Id.; see Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972) (stating that "mere
interest in a problem, no matter how longstanding the interest and no matter how
qualified the organization is in evaluating the problem, is not sufficient by itself"
to confer standing).
93. Region 8 Forest Serv., 993 F.2d at 809. The alleged injury must be personal
in order to give a plaintiff standing to sue. Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bell-
wood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979).
94. Region 8 Forest Serv., 993 F.2d at 809.
95. The timber companies were legal entities not synonymouns with their em-
ployees. Thus, they were asserting the rights of others in arguing that thier em-
ployees had an interest in the preservation of the woodpecker. For a discussion of
the prudential limitations on standing, see supra note 54 and accompanying text.
See also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) (holding plaintiff must assert own
rights and interests).
96. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113-16 (1976). Plaintiffs may rest
upon the rights of another only if the following three requirements are met: (1)
the plaintiff must have otherwise suffered injury-in-fact; (2) the plaintiff must advo-
cate the third party's rights nearly as effectively as the third party would itself; and
(3) there must be some obstacle to the third party asserting the right itself. Id. at
114-16.
97. Region 8 Forest Serv., 993 F.2d at 810. The court held that the three re-
quirements necessary for a plaintiff to rely on the rights of another were not satis-
fied. Id. First, if asserting rights on behalf of their employees, the timber
companies still must have suffered injury-in-fact; the court held they had not. Id.
Second, the relationship between the timber companies and their employees is not
such that the employers would be nearly as effective proponents of the employees'
interests as the employees themselves. Id. To allow third-party standing, there
must be a strong identity of interests between the third party and the litigating
proponent. Id. (citing Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and
Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 840-42 n.44 (1977) (holding parents had standing to assert
rights of children); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965) (holding
doctor had standing to assert rights of patients)). The Eleventh Circuit in Region 8
Forest Service concluded this strong identity of interests was missing in the employer-
employee relationship. 993 F.2d at 810. Finally, there was no obstacle to the em-
ployees of the timber companies in personally asserting their rights. Id. The court
distinguished the situation in Region 8 Forest Service from a situation in which a
group is truly unable to assert its own rights. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S.
449, 458-59 (1958) (holding organization had right to assert claim on behalf of
members to protect members from being compelled to disclose their affiliation
with association in violation of First Amendment).
[Vol. V. p. 529
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court found that the timber companies failed to establish a suffi-
cient environmental injury to establish standing.98
4. Alleged Procedural Injuries
Finally, the timber companies sought to establish standing by
alleging they suffered sufficient procedural injuries. 99 The timber
companies argued that the Forest Service's failure to follow the pro-
cedures mandated by the Species Act, NEPA, and NFMA ° ° denied
them of their rights to information, participation, and informed
decisionmaking. 10
In analyzing the procedural injuries, the court followed the
reasoning used by the Supreme Court in Lujan v. Defenders of Wild-
life.' °2 In Defenders of Wildlife, the Court denied several environmen-
tal groups standing because the alleged injury to their procedural
rights constituted nothing more than a "mere generalized griev-
ance about government" which did not equate to "an Article III
case or controversy." 03 The Region 8 Forest Service court similarly
held that the timber companies' alleged procedural injuries were
nothing more than general grievances common to all citizens.'0 4
Consequently, the court concluded that the timber companies
failed to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement necessary to establish
standing for procedural injuries. 10 5
B. Critical Analysis
In Region 8 Forest Service,106 the court held that the timber com-
panies did not have standing to sue the Forest Service. 10 7 In deny-
98. Region 8 Forest Serv., 993 F.2d at 810.
99. Id.
100. For a discussion of the three Acts and the requirements under each, see
supra notes 29-42 and accompanying text.
101. Region 8 Forest Serw., 993 F.2d at 810.
102. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136-37 (1990).
103. Id. at 2143.
104. Region 8 Forest Sew., 993 F.2d at 810.
105. Id. In reaching its holding in Defenders of Wildlife the Supreme Court
stated that if the environmental groups had suffered injury to a distinct, well-de-
fined interest, they would have had standing to assert a procedural injury. 112 S.
Ct. at 2142 n.7. The timber companies relied on this statement, arguing that they
had in fact suffered a distinct and concrete injury. Region 8 Forest Serv., 993 F.2d at
810-11. The Eleventh Circuit in Region 8 Forest Service rejected this argument and
reiterated that no economic, environmental, or quality of life injuries had been
alleged. Id. at 811.
106. The timber companies in Region 8 Forest Service brought suit against the
Forest Service because of the greater protection provided for the red-cockaded
woodpecker by its new policy. 993 F.2d at 802.
107. Id.
1994] 543
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ing standing, the court rejected all four types of injury alleged by
the timber companies.108 The court properly dismissed the alleged
environmental injuries since they appeared tenuous. However, in
dismissing the economic, quality of life, and procedural injuries,
the court may have overlooked justiciable claims of injury made by
the timber companies.
The court correctly denied the timber companies' claim of al-
leged environmental injury. The timber companies had claimed
that the Forest Service interfered with their interest in developing a
woodpecker preservation strategy.10 9 This interest was nothing
more than an interest in ensuring that the woodpecker was not fur-
ther protected. 110 In addition, the timber companies claimed that
they were interested in the strategy because of their employees' in-
terest in the outdoors."' Inconceivably, the timber companies ar-
gued that their employees' love of the outdoors and wildlife gave
them standing to fight actions taken to protect that wildlife and the
beauty of the outdoors. The circularity of this argument is clear.
The timber companies attempted to use their asserted love of the
outdoors to gain standing in court to fight for their right to destroy
it. This alleged injury demonstrated no genuine concern for the
environment and was justly dismissed by the court.
Nonetheless, the court may have erroneously dismissed the
other three injuries. The court relied on the CDA to dismiss the
claims of economic and quality of life injuries, 112 emphasizing that
the timber contracts were made with the government for logging
on public lands."l 3 These contracts expressly provided for resolu-
tion under the CDA114 if the conflict related to any dispute "arising
108. Id. at 811.
109. For a discussion of these alleged interests, see supra notes 90-98 and ac-
companying text.
110. See Region 8 Forest Serv. Timber Purchasers Council v. Alcock, 736 F.
Supp. 267, 272 n.2 (N.D. Ga. 1990), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 993 F.2d 800,
cert. denied sub nom. Southern Timber Purchasers Council v. Meier, - U.S. -, 114
S. Ct. 683 (1994). This point is made clear in a footnote in the district court opin-
ion: "This is akin to saying that [the timber companies want] to protect the wood-
pecker in order to get it off the endangered species list so that they can destroy its
environment." Region 8 Forest Serv., 736 F. Supp. at 272 n.2. According to the dis-
trict court, this argument admitted the timber companies' lack of genuine environ-
mental interest. Id. This alleged "environmental" interest was therefore not a
cognizable injury under Article III. Id.
111. Region 8 Forest Serv., 993 F.2d at 809.
112. For a discussion of the court's analysis, see supra notes 72-89 and accom-
panying text.
113. Region 8 Forest Sew., 993 F.2d at 802.
114. For a discussion of the relevant CDA provisions, see supra note 77 and
accompanying text.
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under or relating to" the contracts. 115 However, the court bypassed
the real issue in determining whether the CDA applied: whether
the injuries alleged actually "arose under or [were] related to" their
contracts with the government. The timber companies did not al-
lege breach of contract nor did they pursue contractual remedies.
Instead, the timber companies sought relief for injuries suffered as
a result of alleged violations of the Species Act, NEPA, and NFMA.
The timber companies claimed that the Forest Service violated
these acts by changing the woodpecker policy. 116 Seeking this type
of relief places the timber companies in a position similar to envi-
ronmental plaintiffs suing the Forest Service for a change in policy
that had an adverse affect on their lives." 7 Because environmental
plaintiffs had in prior cases been granted standing generously, as
demonstrated by Sierra Club v. Morton and SCRAP,118 the timber
companies in Region 8 Forest Service should have received the same
liberality in achieving standing.
In addition, the quality of life injuries alleged included loss of
jobs, loss of public services, and a decrease in the tax base; these
claimed harms constituted substantive injuries and were more than
"mere attenuations of the economic injuries alleged." 1 9 As with
the economic injuries, the timber companies did not rely on the
government contracts in alleging their quality of life injuries. 120
Rather, their injury allegedly arose from the Forest Service's viola-
tion of the the Species Act, NEPA, and NFMA. A federal policy
change in disregard of proper procedural safeguards can harm the
general quality of life. This harm can be particularly devastating in
small logging towns surrounding national forests where most
money, employment, and livelihood flows from the timber indus-
115. Region 8 Forest Serv., 993 F.2d at 807.
116. Id. at 802. The court attempted to distinguish National Helium Corp. v.
Morton, 455 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1971), by speculating that it was at least "possible
that the plaintiff [in that case] suffered a non-contractual injury." Id. at 808 n.11.
However, the court in National Helium made it clear that the injury at issue arose
under the plaintiffs' contracts. National Helium, 455 F.2d at 654.
117. For a discussion of the treatment of environmental plaintiffs with respect
to the standing issue in prior decisions, see supra notes 56-70 and accompanying
text.
118. For a discussion of these cases, see supra notes 59-63 and accompanying
text. It is important to note, however, that the two recent Supreme Court deci-
sions in Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990), and Lujan v. De-
fenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. -, 112 S. Ct 2130, 2136 (1992), may suggest a
growing trend toward stricter standing requirements for environmental plaintiffs.
For a discussion of these cases, see supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
119. Region 8 Forest Serv., 993 F.2d at 809.
120. Id.
19941
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try.12 ' This alleged harm should have been sufficient to establish
the timber companies' standing since it was an independent source
of harm that did not arise out of their government contracts. 12 2
Finally, the procedural injuries alleged constituted more than
"mere generalized grievances."123 The Forest Service was required
to follow certain procedures under the Species Act, NFMA, and
NEPA.124 In failing to follow these procedures, the Forest Service
denied the timber companies their rights to information, participa-
tion, and informed decisionmaking. By virtue of holding contracts
with the government, the timber companies were directly and ad-
versely affected by the Forest Service's failure to adhere to proce-
dural requirements. These injuries should have satisfied the injury-
in-fact requirement for standing. 25
V. IMPACT
The issue presented in Region 8 Forest Service is likely to arise in
the future because timber companies throughout the United States
are currently logging in national forest lands pursuant to govern-
ment contracts.' 26 All of these forest lands contain endangered
121. For a discussion of logging areas, see supra notes 1-6 and accompanying
text.
122. This is not a comment, however, on how any action would be resolved on
the merits if the standing issue were overcome. It may be fair to suggest that the
timber companies would encounter difficulties proving violations of the three Acts
by the Forest Service. In fact, with the rapid decline of the woodpecker popula-
tion, the Forest Service may have been held in violation of any of the three Acts if it
had not changed the policy as it did. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 926 F.2d 429,
439 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding Forest Service violated Species Act by not changing
plan to protect red-cockaded woodpecker where population was in rapid decline
and headed for extinction). However, this Note strongly suggests that the timber
companies' action should have proceeded beyond the standing issue to the merits.
123. Region 8 Forest Serv., 993 F.2d at 810. The court characterized the timber
companies' alleged procedural injuries as "mere generalized grievances" not
unique to the timber companies, but rather shared by all citizens. Id.
124. Id. at 803. Specifically, the Forest Service was required to formally con-
sult with the Fish and Wildlife Service in order to change a policy already in effect
and established in the Wildlife Habitat Management Handbook. Id. For a discus-
sion of these requirements, see supra notes 29-42 and accompanying text
125. For a discussion of the injury-in-fact requirement for standing, see supra
notes 46-55 and accompanying text.
126. See, e.g., Alice M. Rivlin, Saving a U.S. Forest, WASH. Posr, Oct. 6, 1989, at
A31 (Forest Service entered into 50-year contracts with two large timber companies
concerning cutting in Tongass National Forest in Southeast Alaska); Ward Sinclair,
Reagan Orders an Extension ofLoggingPacts, WASH. POsrJuly 29, 1983, at I (describ-
ing extension of hundreds of existing contracts between timber companies and
government in Northwest).
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wildlife protected by federal policies. 127 If the Forest Service
changes its policies without following the exact procedures pre-
scribed by the Species Act, NEPA, or NFMA, any industry affected
by those policy changes may attempt to file suit.
Currently, the Northwest region's spotted owl controversy con-
tinues as timber companies and the government battle over
whether logging interests should give way to the interests of the en-
dangered owl.128 If the Forest Service changes its policy regarding
the spotted owl without following the proper procedures, courts
may again be faced with the issue of whether companies fighting
the policy change will have standing to sue. In that respect, Region
8 Forest Service may have far-reaching precedential value if other fed-
eral circuit courts agree with the reasoning and outcome of the de-
cision. Furthermore, this decision may discourage timber
companies and other industries from asserting their right to sue.
Disgruntled companies may fear that bringing a suit against the
Forest Service would be futile, since any "real" injury suffered would
not appear "real" enough to the court to satisfy even the prelimi-
nary standing requirements.
VI. CONCLUSION
Throughout the country there is growing concern over endan-
gered wildlife and the destruction of the environment. 129 Conse-
quently, people whose livelihoods depend upon industries that
threaten wildlife may simply have to alter their way of living to save
the lives of endangered species. As one vice-president of a north-
western timber company stated succinctly: "[H]ere we are today
with a wonderful old growth resource base, and what was once a
blessing is now a curse." °30 For the thousands of timber communi-
ties throughout the country that once looked to the forests for
127. For a discussion of the Species Act, NEPA, and NFMA, three examples of
federal legislation used to protect endangered wildlife in national forests, see supra
notes 29-42 and accompanying text.
128. See, e.g., Peter Callaghan, The Owl and the Lumberjack: Can Clinton Break the
Logam?, WASH. Posr, Apr. 2, 1993, at A4 (discussing conference attempting to
break stalemate over spotted owl). See generally Flournoy, supra note 15 (summariz-
ing spotted owl litigation and challenges ahead).
129. See, e.g., Steve Young, Tree Slaughter: Your Taxes at Work, WASH. PosT, Aug.
13, 1989, at B3 (discussing concerns about deforestation and its detrimental im-
pact on endangered species and earth's climate).
130. Kenworthy, Timber Plan, supra note 1, at A8.
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wealth and survival, it may be time to begin looking somewhere
else.
Linda M. Barone
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